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What Have We Learned? Strategic Latency and  
the Future of Special Operations Forces
Zachary S. Davis
“In my technicolor childhood 
We burned incandescent dreams 
Illuminatin’ on these future things 
That didn’t turn out like we thought they would 
Now we’re doin’ things we never dreamed we could”
“Bit Logic,” by the Bottle Rockets (2018)i
Introduction
Think differently, or face the consequences. Many of the assumptions we have taken 
for granted about how the world works must be reexamined in the light of current 
events. It’s not just the latest pandemic, broken institutions, global instability, or the 
onslaught of new technologies that are causing radical change. The world is being 
transformed physically and politically. Technology is the handmaiden of much of this 
change. But since the sweep of global change is transforming the face of warfare, 
United States special operations forces (SOF) must adapt to these circumstances. 
Fortunately, adaptation is in the SOF DNA. 
This book examined the global changes affecting SOF and offers possible solutions 
to the complexities challenging many long-held assumptions. The authors are a mix of 
leading experts in technology, business, policy, intelligence, and geopolitics, partnered 
with experienced special operators who either cowrote chapters or reviewed them 
to ensure accuracy and relevance for SOF. Our goal was to provide insights into the 
changes around us and generate ideas about how SOF can adapt and succeed in 
the emerging operational environment. In this wrap-up chapter, I try to pull together 
the strands to present a broad overview of what we have learned. We don’t cover 
everything in this book, but there’s a good chance we know the right people and can 
put you in touch with them. 
Questioning Assumptions: Has Everything Changed? 
Our challenge required us to distinguish between those things that are constant and 
those that are in a state of flux and require new thinking. For example, the laws of 
physics have not changed, although we are discovering new ways of using them to our 
advantage. The chapters on biology, material science, and cyber operations offer new 
insights from the sciences. But many fundamental characteristics of our surroundings 
remain unchanged, starting with human nature. 
i  The Bottle Rockets are an American alt-country band formed in 1992. 
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Not Everything Has Changed
Modern humans are driven by the same motivations that have inspired philosophy, 
creativity, discovery, and conquest for eons. This is important because so many things 
depend on human behavior, including the future of war, politics, and technology. The 
changes we see around us do not diminish the role of fear, insecurity, compassion, 
and creativity in defining the human condition. With the possible exception of 
artificially manipulated mass movements (which are addressed in the chapter by 
Herb Lin and Trisha Wyman), human nature remains the fundamental building block 
of global order. Therefore, protection from aggressive neighbors remains a primary 
motivation for humanity, and security is an enduring universal preoccupation. 
Another constant is the way people organize for their security. Nation-states are 
undergoing many important changes, but they persist as the fundamental building 
blocks of international order and the primary providers of security to the vast majority 
of people on earth. This is true despite the limitations of sovereignty challenging the 
ability of nation-states to provide security for populations under their authority. The 
security dilemma that drives nations to defend themselves inevitably threatens other 
nations. Deterrence, therefore, will endure as a primary means for states to prevent 
aggression. The chapter by Brad Roberts shows how deterrence functions as a 
centerpiece of global order and outlines the role of SOF in reinforcing that order. 
Another constant is civil conflict within states, as aggrieved groups challenge 
existing governments. Groups and individuals will inevitably resort to terrorism as a 
means of expressing displeasure with more powerful adversaries. New weapons and 
tactics may empower violent extremist organizations, complicating but not diminishing 
the SOF role in countering terrorism and supporting allies with foreign internal defense 
(FID) and other core mission capabilities.
Global competition for power, authority, territory, and resources is relentless, and 
war remains the final arbiter of unresolvable conflict, as it has throughout human 
history. The addition of new domains of conflict in outer space, cyber space, and the 
gray zoneii complicate this fundamental reality. With these underlying conditions firmly 
in place, long-standing practices of statecraft—diplomacy, alliances, and deterrence—
remain essential to the maintenance of order. What is less certain is the future role of 
the international norms and multilateral institutions that have restrained the uses of 
force and imposed boundaries on violent conflict. Those appear to be changing.
Another global reality—one that is less rooted in antiquity but has gradually 
asserted itself as a defining aspect of global order—is globalization. The inevitable 
result of a global population approaching 8 billion people, globalization connects 
people and places in ways that are producing unprecedented physical and geopolitical 
conditions. We are more interconnected in more ways than ever before, making 
us more vulnerable, yet in some ways more powerful, in our interdependence. The 
ii  The Cambridge English Dictionary defines the gray zone as “activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are 
sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war.” (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/
gray-zone) 
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Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 demonstrated how interconnected the world has become, 
overwhelming governments, institutions, stock markets, and global health systems. 
Several chapters in the book examine the consequences of this interconnectedness, 
which affects everything from communications, supply chains, food security, migration 
flows, and disease transmission. Globalization must be considered as the backdrop 
for future military operations. Intense global connectedness affects many aspects of 
the special operations mission set directly. 
Strategic Latency for SOF: Changes in Technology,  
the Balance of Power, and the Rules of Warfare
“If looks could kill, they probably will.” 
“Games without Frontiers,” by Peter Gabriel (1980)
With these basic elements of the operating environment firmly in our sights, what 
are the new and unfamiliar factors of which we should be aware? Which of our 
assumptions should be adjusted to fit changing circumstances? These dependent 
variables reflect the changing balance of global power, measured in terms of military, 
economic, technological, cultural, and other elements of power. Prediction is hard, 
but forecasting can provide key insights, as shown in the chapter by Richard Lum 
and Ed Churchill. How will the convergence of known and unknown factors shape the 
operational environment and create risks and opportunities for SOF? 
We define Strategic Latency as the potential for these dynamic factors to align 
in ways that shift the global balance of power. We use the word strategic to identify 
factors of power that have truly consequential significance for world affairs, as 
opposed to merely important or interesting developments. For example, nuclear fission 
held latent potential to shift the global balance of power, which was realized by the 
Manhattan Project and fully weaponized in 1945. Nuclear weapons changed the world. 
The military applications of aircraft, missiles, computers, the internet, and space 
technology might also qualify to be included in this category of strategic effects. 
Other candidates might include genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, quantum 
computing, and autonomous vehicles. Quite often, the convergence of technologies 
creates transformative effects, as in the combination of nukes and missiles, drones 
and artificial intelligence, and big data with social media. The strategic latency of 
many key emerging technologies was evaluated in these chapters, viewed through the 
lens of their potential relevance for SOF. Our hope is that the SOF community will find 
these insights to be relevant to its missions. 
Technology is a dynamic function of human innovation, and, thus, one of the 
primary changing aspects of the operational landscape. Strategic latency focuses 
on the role of technology in world affairs. What other dynamic factors could define 
the operational environment for SOF? While the essence of human nature stays the 
same, cultures and organizations evolve. Nation-states follow their historic destiny, 
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experiencing periods of success and failure. Civilizations rise and fall. Individual and 
group identities are also changing, as described in the chapter by Jennifer Snow. New 
forms of identity and association beyond nationality complicate the role of nation-
states and add complexity to the global landscape. What new groups will organize 
themselves to express shared interests, sometimes challenging national power and 
legitimacy? Will SOF be tasked to counter or support such nonstate actors? 
The Shifting Landscape: A New Balance of Power
Other forces are also at work. Nationalist, authoritarian, and populist movements are 
reshaping political allegiances and changing the fate of nations. Nationalist leaders 
across the globe demonize minority groups and foment hatred based on religious and 
ethnic association. SOF is already navigating these troubled waters. At the same time, 
great-power competition has reemerged as revisionist powers seek to undermine the 
post–World War II international order. China is seizing this moment to redefine the 
Indo-Pacific balance of power and assert itself on the world stage. It is using massive 
investments in critical technologies to build its economic and military strength. The 
chapter on Chinese biotech advancements by James Giordano and L. R. Bremseth 
highlighted the challenge we face with Beijing’s rapid transfer of strategic latency from 
basic science to military applications for use in nonkinetic warfare. Elsa Kania and 
Peter Wood examined Beijing’s concept of operations for gray-zone warfare. Meanwhile, 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia may not be as adept at channeling economic power into military 
might but competes by matching its strengths to US shortcomings, by picking political 
and technological sweet spots to exploit US and Western vulnerabilities. The chapter 
by Glenn Chafetz, Jonathan Fagins, and Michael Nacht highlighted some of the ways 
Russian SOF are innovating in modern unconventional warfare. 
Russia and China are not alone in welcoming a sweeping realignment of global 
power. Iran, North Korea, and others are seizing the moment to diminish American 
influence and advance their own interests and ideas. Sometime allies such as Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan appear less committed than previously to longstanding ties 
with the United States and actively seek new partners for a new era. Rising powers 
such as India and Brazil seek to increase their influence in the emerging multipolar 
jumble. Some trusted allies may question the United States’ long-term reliability and 
seek new options. Old alliances are being reshuffled, and new ones are forming. 
Whatever new alliances are in store, SOF must be prepared to embrace the chaos and 
complexity of the new world order. This too plays to SOF strengths in working with and 
adapting to local conditions.
Expanding Our Concepts of the Operational Environment
Fundamental changes in weather and climate also pose important new challenges for 
SOF. Hurricanes, wildfires, environmental hazards, and rising sea levels all have direct 
consequences for military operations. Shortages of food, water, and energy increase 
political instability and may lead to conflict, and will certainly affect issues of access, 
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sustainability, and partnerships. How will SOF operate in these conditions? Our chapter 
on food security by Molly Jahn and her team described how food systems have become 
a contested domain for a wide range of subconventional warfare. These nontraditional 
security issues have become central features of the SOF operating environment. 
One big takeaway from the events surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak is that 
soldiers and sailors can’t fight as intended if they are sick.1 The specter of whole 
battle groups being put out of commission because of sickness or deterred by 
pestilence-infested war zones raises troubling questions for force protection and 
human performance. In that vein, the chapter by Diane DiEullius and Peter Emanuel 
examined issues related to human enhancement and performance, including scientific 
and moral prospects for cyborg soldiers. Giordano and Bremseth speculated about 
the use of biological agents for hybrid warfare. SOF units may be better prepared 
to cope with such onerous environmental hazards and already possess specialized 
capabilities to enable them to operate under increasingly challenging circumstances. 
But there may be surprises ahead, and hidden costs associated with the technologies 
we use to cope with these adversities. 
Technology always has at least two sides, divided between peaceful and military 
applications. In their chapter about new forensic techniques, Brad Hart and Brian 
Souza identified opportunities for detecting health threats that can also be used to 
track individuals. For SOF this translates into possible force protection applications 
and uses in tracking high-value targets. When combined with a variety of ubiquitous 
surveillance methods and big-data-driven artificial intelligence, as described in 
the chapter by Paul Scharre, might it be possible to know the health status and 
whereabouts of every person on earth? How might SOF deal with these trends? John 
Tullius outlined what a convergence of these developments could mean for intelligence 
collection, analysis, and operations. When we add to the picture the element of 
geospatial transparency—the all-seeing eye in the sky—as described in the chapter 
by George duMais, it is clear that many operational concepts will need to be modified, 
especially with respect to covert action. 
Changing global and national demographics also have implications for SOF, as 
aging populations and youth bulges shape the destiny of nation-states and peoples, 
causing internal and regional instability across the globe. Migration and refugee 
flows are already affecting outcomes in the Middle East, Europe, across Africa, and 
spanning Asia. The fate of the Kurds, Rohingya, Huthis, Yazidis, and other ethnic 
minority groups have already figured prominently into SOF thinking. Planners and 
operators must increasingly find ways to maneuver in such challenging human 
terrain. Rita Konaev’s chapter on megacities examined the challenges that massive 
concentrations of humanity pose for SOF. Not all these changes are new, nor are they 
necessarily all bad for SOF. Urban warfare is not new, and working with minority groups 
under difficult circumstances is part of the SOF playbook. 
There are opportunities to be gleaned, and strategic latency to be exploited, from 
all these vectors. In his groundbreaking chapter, Marshall Monroe proposed a new way 
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of thinking about innovation that could accelerate SOF’s ability to envision the future, 
be the first to adapt to emerging trends, train for over-the-horizon battlefields, and ride 
the wave of change to victory. 
Declining Influence of Rules, Norms, and Treaties and the Future of WMD
Beyond the physical environment, changing norms of behavior increasingly define the 
political environment. On a global scale, the laws of warfare and prohibitions on the 
acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be losing influence. 
At the same time, access to WMD technology could make such weapons increasingly 
available to nations, groups, and individuals. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons 
Convention all face significant challenges, especially with respect to verification 
and enforcement. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are poised to break 
out of these restraints to make a dramatic comeback from being outlawed to 
being widely viewed as essential tools of national defense. The widespread use of 
chemical weapons in Syria, Russian and North Korean assassinations using WMD 
materials, and the continued growth of nuclear stockpiles in a number of countries 
all suggest WMD will feature prominently in future conflict. Whether naturally 
occurring or unleashed as weapons of war, biological pandemics greatly complicate 
the operational environment. 
Now that SOCOM has expanded its role in countering these weapons, what is 
needed to ensure success? In his chapter, Brendan Melley assessed SOCOM’s 
approach to the countering WMD mission and reviews preparations for a world 
where WMD shape the battlefield as never before. Michael Greene and I examined 
what it means for SOF to win and lose under such circumstances, where WMD are 
increasingly prevalent. 
Beyond flagging controls and growing interest in WMD, established global 
standards governing trade, commerce, intellectual property, scientific research 
practices, corruption, building standards, and law enforcement could lose their 
influence in the emerging global disorder. Without a consensus among powerful states 
to promote and enforce norms of behavior, rules become voluntary, and rule breakers 
can be expected to seek advantage from lax standards of conduct. At the same time, 
disinformation campaigns further erode confidence in goods, services, governments, 
and national purpose. Cooperative international organizations depend on support from 
powerful nations for their legitimacy, and wither when they are neglected. Even the 
poster child for international cooperation, the United Nations (UN)—and its affiliated 
agencies—appears to be losing its former authoritative place in the world order. The 
UN Security Council, once a bastion of US and Western influence, has become a victim 
of competing worldviews. How will changes in attitudes toward multilateral cooperation 
and the rule of law affect SOF? Here too, there are risks and opportunities. 
Moral and ethical codes of conduct shift naturally along with the balance of 
power, less reflecting the Western values that inspired the creation of international 
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treaties and multilateral organizations and increasingly challenged by rising powers 
and revisionist states eager to cast off the strictures of American influence. A new 
global outlook on longstanding ethics and norms is poised to shape the operational 
environment. 
The Multi-Domain Battlefield
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”
—attributed to Albert Einstein2
While war is a constant of international competition, the locations where and methods 
by which it is prosecuted are expanding. The battlefield now includes the deepest ocean 
trenches, vast subterranean lairs, drone-infested airspace, every nook and cranny of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, the polar regions, the gray zone, and outer space. Autonomous 
systems can fight in any of these domains, evoking science-fiction visions of robot armies. 
In his chapter, Michael Alexander illuminated what these trends mean for subterrain 
combat. DuMais extended the discussion to the space domain. A tsunami of information 
about the entire battlespace informs and misleads. What is the collective effect of 
multidomain conflict on SOF operations? What is the SOF role in these new domains?
The cyber domain has become a primary focus of global competition, as described 
in the chapters dedicated to illuminating the SOF role in cyber conflict. The chapter 
by Philip Reiner and Whitney Kassel outlined how SOF can integrate cyber training 
into its FID mission. David Bray and Vint Cerf showed how open societies fall prey 
to cyberwarfare. Further, Lin and Wyman illuminated the offensive and defensive 
challenges for SOF in the use of social media for influence operations. The chapter 
by Pablo Breuer, David Perlman, and Sara-Jayne Terp looked at the implications of 
weaponized information, and the chapter by Peter Singer examined the broader strategic 
implications of the weaponization of so many aspects of civil society. Offensive and 
defensive cyber tools have become indispensable additions to the SOF toolkit.
Many technologies that do not immediately appear to have relevance for SOF are 
revealing their latent military value. The introduction of 5G wireless opens a floodgate 
of information across domains, as described by Toby Redshaw in his chapter on the 
implications of 5G for SOF. Girish Nandakumar and Jon Cederquist reviewed how 
blockchain technology could affect SOF, and Scharre analyzed the effects of artificial 
intelligence on the SOF operational environment. Even things as seemingly basic 
as accurate timekeeping could have unanticipated operational consequences, as 
described by Robert G. Kennedy III in his chapter on quantum clocks. 
Across all domains, an internet of military things links millions of sensors that feed 
massive amounts of data to warfighters, planners, analysts, and decision-makers. This 
data can help locate, track, and target people and objects. But the expansive concept 
of boundless warfare also further blurs the distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants, drawing civilian populations into a web of undeclared combat zones. 
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Equipping the Hyper-Enabled Operator
Which new technologies are best suited to help SOF succeed in this complex 
geopolitical and technological ecosphere? Leo Blanken and Phillip Swintek examined 
SOF’s role as an innovation hub. As early adaptors, special operators are often on the 
cutting edge of strategic latency. 
Lawrence Bronisz and Dominic Peterson showed how additive manufacturing (or 
3D printing, as it is often called)—with its vast potential for using different materials 
and novel engineering designs, coupled with its portability—is a game changer for 
the SOF—and our adversaries. Nanotechnology is not the end-all, but as Randall 
Schunk related in his chapter, it is certainly a core enabler that has lived up to much 
of the hype of the early 2000s and is now ubiquitous in military systems, including 
advanced communications, novel sensors, new armor materials, and in situ medical 
treatments—with more to come! Energetic materials are, by definition, “disruptive.” 
Bryce Tappan and Patrick Bowden revealed how the future of advanced energetics 
is rich with new chemistry and designs to tailor the disruptive effects, to suit the 
needs and imagination of the SOF. Michael Valley reported in his chapter that 
although a Harry Potter invisibility cloak does not exist (yet), metamaterials—namely 
natural materials fashioned creatively to deliver unconventional properties—present 
unprecedented opportunities to manipulate energy, be it sound, light, radar, or 
shock. Thus, metamaterials offer radical possibilities in the SOF battlespace. Brian 
Holmes and Michael David showed flexible electronics are a new paradigm for the 
warfighter, with many applications in place or underway, such as antennas, sensors, 
and RF circuitry. The world is experiencing a revolution in compact, lightweight 
power sources, like lithium-ion batteries and advanced fuel cells. Karen Swider-
Lyons, Joshua Lamb, and Yet-Ming Chiang clarified that this presents enormous 
potential for the SOF, but it is not without challenges, since key raw materials are 
not controlled by the United States. Finally, Robert Skaggs and Frank Gac showed 
the armor of the future is ripe with possibilities that build on not only new and 
advanced materials but also the entire suite of developments described in the “The 
Materials World” section of the book. This offers the potential to equip the soldier 
of the future with protection, power, communications, and incredible awareness 
of the environment. Thus, we truly are entering a new age of innovation and 
experimentation to identify mission-specific applications.
Big changes in the commercial world also have immediate impacts on SOF, 
especially for efforts to partner with companies to support critical mission 
requirements such as tailored technology needs for SOF teams. Snow, Brad 
Chedister, and Tamberin Bates reviewed the efforts of SOFWERX and other 
innovative platforms to find reliable commercial partners for SOF. The chapter by 
Sara Dudley showed how cryptocurrencies are being used to evade controls and 
support criminal enterprises. Success in identifying the right technologies for 
the mission, developing them into SOF capabilities, and fielding them effectively 
depends on understanding the private sector and finding the right partners. 
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We offer several big picture perspectives on the future role of SOF. Marveling 
at the massive complexity of this multi-domain “system of systems,” Mark Maier 
and Churchill gave us ideas about how to conceptualize the SOF niche within the 
broader context of global military operations. The chapter by Lum and Churchill 
takes a future-studies approach to forecast major trends in irregular warfare and 
technology innovation that will shape the SOF mission. Dan Leaf tied it all together by 
orienting the future of modern-day commandos within the emerging global operational 
environment, including the many constraining political and economic factors that will 
limit SOF freedom of action. These strategic analyses of the SOF future integrate the 
geopolitical and technological trends projected throughout the volume. Understanding 
the chaos is a necessary first step to getting the right tools to train and fight 
effectively within it. 
Changes in technology, geopolitics, and the commercial sector have important 
consequences for core SOF activities, including FID, civil affairs, military information 
support, counterproliferation, psychological operations, security forces assistance, 
counterinsurgency, and humanitarian assistance. To exploit the strategic latency 
of developments in these areas, SOF benefits from cultivating networks of trusted 
experts who can provide substantive knowledge that is directly tied to mission 
requirements. The chapters here represent such a network. We have endeavored to 
link expert knowledge and operational experience to SOF’s core functions and tie them 
to emerging challenges and opportunities. Our goal is for the SOF community, along 
with the broader military and intelligence communities who work with them, to find 
this to be a useful resource for understanding tomorrow’s challenges and stimulating 
discussion about ways to exploit strategic latency for US advantage. 
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